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THE ROLE OF FORCE IN
THE INTERNATIONAL
JURIDICAL ORDER
WILLIAM V.

O'BRIEN*

good war or a bad peace.
If that be true, the task of true internationalists is to work for the
total elimination of war, that is to say, of all international force. In their
understandable revulsion to modern wars many internationalists have
indeed tended towards the position that to work for peace is to work
for a world in which "armed force" will play no part, a world in which
disputes will be settled peaceably and reasonably through international
law and international organization. This point of view has influenced
our thinking since the establishment of the League of Nations and
despite many disappointments we continue to hear pleas for a world
order free from the horrors of international conflict. Some of the most
respected of our professional men and scholars are joining in the cries
for "The Rule of Law in the International Community," "World Peace
through World Law," and the like.
Walter Lippmann and Raymond Aron, among others, have remarked
on our tendency to go to extremes with respect to questions of international relations, from total disarmament to total war, from unconditional surrender to bundles for defeated enemies. Perhaps there is an
element of this kind of zig-zagging in the desire to change abruptly
from a world of intense conflict to a world where everything will be
solved by submission to laws. To dramatize this concept, the lawyers
of the world recently gathered at Runnymede to commemorate the
Magna Charta and the triumph of the "Rule of Law."
But what indeed was the scene at Runnymede? Did Good King John
succumb to some "unite or perish" pamphlets and joyfully declare the
Rule of Law throughout his domain? Indeed no! We are led to believe
from our histories - not to mention numerous novels, movies and TV
interpretations of the world of Robin Hood - that King John was a
scoundrel of the first order who was forced to acknowledge the rights
T HAS BEEN SAID THAT THERE NEVER was a
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of those of his subjects who had the capacity and desire to fight for them. (You will
recall that the Common Man was not
greatly affected by the provisions of the
Charter.) Moreover, knowing their man,
the nobles at Runnymede made specific
provisions for the enforcement of the compact in the highly likely event that the
King broke it.
On the other hand, great minds from
Pierre Dubois, Dante, Bentham, Kant,
Ladd and Baroness Von Suttner to Hutchins have produced peace plans and international charters sufficient to fill volumes
- without noticeably contributing to anything more than the history of ideas.
The problem of reconciling the desire
for peace within the community - whether
national or international - with the necessity for fighting for justice is not new. In
our own national history we faced it at
Philadelphia in the Constitutional Convention of 1788; we faced it at Fort Sumter in
1861; we faced it when we decided that
we were not too proud to fight the "War to
end Wars"; we faced it in the spring of
1940; in Korea in 1951 and, to an extent
not entirely known, in the Berlin crisis of
the past year.
Granted the sincere desire that we all
have for an international juridical order,
what is the role of force? Has it ceased to
be relevant to our aspirations? I suggest
that force is vitally important to the concept of an international juridical order in
three ways: (1) as a reality to be faced;
(2) as a legal necessity' (3) as a moral
means: to attaining the ends of the international juridical order.
First, international conflict and recourse
to force continues to be characteristic of the
world in which we live, regardless of

ephemeral "thaws." World juridical order
means the triumph of law and order over
unrestrained international force. The triumph, like the triumph of fundamental
rights at Runnymede, must come about,
in the final analysis, as the result of the
triumph of force utilized on behalf of justice over force opposing justice. Unfettered
international force is a problem. To use the
term of Charles de Visscher, it is a "reality"
which we must face in order to achieve a
true international juridical order. We must
learn a great deal more about the enormous
reality of our world, unpleasant as it is,
just as the doctor and the social worker
must learn more about human diseases and
human want.
Second, the improving but still primitive international juridical order requires
force to uphold it. The authors of the
United Nations Charter realistically recognized this and fashioned the institutions and
procedures for mobilizing force on behalf
of the juridically organized international
community. These institutions and procedures are a central, if not the central, part
of the United Nations Organization. Let us
therefore review the provisions of the
Charter in order that we may obtain an
authoritative view of the legal status of
force.
Article 1, paragraph 1, states as one of
the purposes of the Organization the maintenance of peace and security, by " . . .
taking collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace" as
well as providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
The Charter proceeds to develop a
regime which divides international force
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into three categories: (1) aggression; (2)
collective enforcement action in support of
decisions of the organization; (3) individual and collective, self-defense.
The relevant provisions of the Charter
concerning aggression would appear to be
the following:
In Article 1, paragraph 1, there is as we
have seen the reference to suppression of
"aggression" and "other breaches of the
peace."
Article 2, paragraph 13, requires that
"all Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice are not endangered."
Paragraph 4 states that "all Members
shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
In principle, therefore, the precedents of
the League Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, and other international conventions
"outlawing" war are brought to fruition in
a flat proscription against individual recourse to international force. In principle,
all such unilateral uses of force are outlawed and branded as illegal acts of aggression.
But there remain, under the Charter, two
kinds of situations in which the use of international force is permitted, if not demanded.
First, it is envisaged that force may_ very
likely be required to enforce the provisions
of the Charter, just as force is required in
all juridically organized communities. We
have noted the allusions in Article 1 to the
suppression of aggression and the mainte-
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nance of security. Article 2, paragraph 2,
places an obligation on all members to
".... fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them" and one such obligation
is to ". . . give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter," while refraining ". . . from giving assistance to any
state against which the United Nations is
taking preventative or enforcement action."
There follow in Chapter VII, Articles
39-50, detailed provisions for "Action with
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches
of the Peace and Acts of Aggression." Particularly noteworthy is Article 42 which
states: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 [Coercive measures not involving the
use of armed forces, such as the interruption of economic relations, communications,
and severance of diplomatic relations]
would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air,
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations
by air, sea, or land forces of Members of
the United Nations."
Articles 43-45 call upon the members to
contribute to UN Forces. Articles 46-47
envisage a Military Staff Committee to
plan and coordinate UN efforts.
Finally, spontaneous acts of legitimate
self-defense are approved by Article 51
which, as the years have gone by, has
turned out to be one of the most important
provisions of the entire Charter. Article 51
states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs
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against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international
Peace and Security. Measures taken by the
Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
An interesting question which I shall
only raise here for mature consideration is
the following: Does Article 51 in effect
grant the right of self-defense to the members as an exception to the general proscription against recourse to force, or does
it father recognize an antecedent "inherent
right"? In any event, extreme positivists

cannot be happy over the French version
of this term, "le droit naturel de defense
legitime."
We know, of course, that the system has
not worked as planned. The Security Council has been rendered virtually helpless by
the rift between the Free World and the
Communist World. Since the Korean War
we have been obliged to fall back upon
the somewhat awkward arrangements of
the Uniting for Peace Resolution whereby
the General Assembly recommends (but
does not order) joint action against an aggressor. But action through the Assembly
is subject to the hazards of ever-shifting
political maneuvering within the Assembly.
There is no effective Military Staff Committee, nor any plans. On the other hand,
the Suez crisis produced the United Nations
Emergency Force. But so far the UNEF
has been restricted to a kind of military
police function of supervising and enforcing truce arrangements. Nevertheless, had
one of the belligerents in the Middle East

resisted the UNEF we might well have had
a war directly involving the United Nations
as such, rather than an Article 51 situation as we had essentially in Korea.
We have said that force is, first of all,
a problem for the international order. Then
we have seen that force is a legal necessity
for the enforcement of the international
juridical order, a necessity clearly recognized in the United Nations Charter. We
now turn to a third aspect of force, as a
moral means which may be used on behalf
of justice and the international common
good.
Long before the institutions of modern
international law and organization developed the distinction between legal and illegal recourse to force, Scholastic Doctrine
recognized a parallel distinction between
just and unjust wars. The similarities between the modern international law of
force and the Just War Doctrine are such
that some authorities have referred to the
former as a modern bellum justum.1
Like the UN Charter, the Scholastic
Doctrine of the Just War begins with the
proposition that recourse to force is not in
general permitted as a means of settling international disputes. St. Thomas, for example, begins his discussion of this subject
by asking whether it is always a sin to make
war. 2 The answer is that war is permitted,
but only under certain conditions. There
must be a grave cause, a real necessity for

1 McDougal & Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and
Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.J.
1057, 1065-68, 1071-74 (1959).
2 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-I, q. 40; cf.
VANDERPOL,

LA

DROIT DE GUERRE

DocTRINE

SCHOLASTIQUE

16-23 (1925).

DER
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taking up arms to remedy the injustice, the
probable consequences of the' war must be
in proportion to the injuries suffered or to
be suffered, and the just belligerent must
5'
pursue his action with "right intention."
There is a clear parallel between the
Just War Theory and Article 51 of the UN
Charter with respect to self-defense. What
of enforcement action on behalf of the international community? There was nothing
comparable to the UN in the late Middle
Ages, although we could say that Christendom during the centuries of the Crusades
was a relatively coherent community. But,
organization features aside, it is interesting
to note that in addition to the defensive
just war, Scholastic Doctrine also recognized the institution of the war of vindictive justice, fought not so much as a matter
of strict defense as on behalf of justice itself
4
and the international common good.
The Theory of the Just War is familiar to
most of us but the question arises as to the
continued validity of that theory and its
relevance to modern war. A partial answer
is to be found in the pronouncements of
Pope Pius XII.
As Father Murray brought out so well,5
the thinking of the late Holy Father on
force in the international community must
be .understood against the background of
his abhorrence of war and his zeal to pro-

(1) Aggressive war is a sin and, legally,
7
an international crime.
(2) But "stringent" self-defense is permitted, even to the extent of ABC (AtomicBacteriological-Chemical) War.8

3 Cf. EPPSTEIN,

6 Id. at 9-10.
7 See Allocution to the World Medical Congress,

THE CATHOLIC TRADITION OF THE

LAW OF NATIONS
UNION

65-123 (1935);

OF SOCIAL

STUDIES,

INTERNATIONAL

CODE OF INTERNA-

ETHICS 106-162 (Eppstein trans. & ed.
1953); ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC

TIONAL

THOUGHT 641-71 (1947); FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (3d ed. 1948); VANDERPOL, Op.

cit. supra note 2.
4 VANDERPOL, op. cit. supra note 2.
5 See

MURRAY,

(1959).

MORALITY

AND

MODERN

WAR

mote the international juridical order. Indeed, may not these views of Pius XII
carry all the more weight precisely because
of their "tortured" and reluctant character?
Further, while the pronouncements on war
of Pius XII are eminently in accord with
the traditional Scholastic Doctrine of the
Just War, they take on a heightened importance precisely because they were enunciated by the first Pope of the Atomic Era. 6
The thinking of Pius XII with respect to
recourse to force seems to come down to
the following propositions:

(3) Moreover, "law and order have
need at times of the powerful arm of
force." 9
(4) When the international community
is threatened with "grave injustice" it must
be defended and, in the light of recent history (particularly the events of 1956),
Communism presents such a threat. 10
(5) Following traditional doctrine, the
conditions of a just war (either of "stringent" defense or on behalf of a threatened
international juridical order) are: major
injustice, real necessity, proportionality,

September 30, 1954, in AAS 46 (1954);
MURRAY, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 10,22.
8 Ibid.

ci.

9 Allocution to the Military Mission of the U.S.A.,
October 8, 1947; cf. MURRAY, op. cit. supra note
5, at 10.
10 Allocution, October 19, 1953; Christmas Message, 1956; cf. MURRAY, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 11.
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and limitation of the use of force."
It is to these last two conditions, proportionality and limitation of the use of force,
that I wish to turn my attention. While a
moral imperative obliges us to develop the
institution of limited war, including limited
nuclear war, it seems to me that an important corollary of this thesis is a corresponding imperative to develop realistic principles and rules for the regulation and
limitation of modern warfare, including
nuclear warfare. In this connection, it is
clear from the study of the historical development of the law of war that the central
problem is that of defining "proportion12
ality" in concrete belligerent situations.
In the light of the foregoing, therefore,
I suggest that the problem of force in the
international community is not the total
elimination of force. Rather, the problem
is one of organizing the international juridical community in such a way as to begin
to approach the goal of that relative "monopoly of force" in the hands of the organized community which is characteristic of
of true juridical order. 13 I might add that
insofar as the tempo of progress towards
such an order is concerned, that I am
among the conservatives who feel that we
are just beginning and that we have a long
road ahead. Illusions as to the imminence
of an advanced international juridical order
are in fact a serious handicap to realistic
internationalists who are working towards
14
that goal.
11 See MuRRAY,op. cit. supranote 5, at 11-15.
12 Id. at 18.
13 KELSEN. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

13-15 (1952).
14 Address delivered at the 31st Annual Conference of the Catholic Association for International
Peace, October 25, 1958, in ROBERTS, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMON GOOD (1958).

If it be granted that international force is
a reality which must be faced under all
three of the aspects which we have seen,
what can be done to improve the situation?
First, we must obviously strive to prevent
recourse to force. We must, obviously,
bend every effort to improve our institutions for pacific settlement of international
disputes and to develop international cooperative efforts designed to attack the
basic causes of international conflict.
But, second, given the very modest progress made to date towards a true international juridical community, given the
absence of anything like a community monopoly of force and, specifically, given the
continuing threat of Communist aggression,
we must also be prepared for situations in
which our primary limitation on force has
failed. If this comes to pass we are obliged
to do our utmost to see that international
conflicts of whatever kind are carried on,
at least on our part, in accordance with the
principles of proportionality and right intention. But neither proportionality nor
right intention are self-evident in practice.
It is necessary to provide more explicit
guides in the form of principles and rules
governing the conduct of war. These normative guides are necessary whether the
conflict be an old-fashioned "war," a "police
action," a "revolution" or any other form
of large-scale violence. The task does not
end with efforts to prevent international
conflict; the Christian tradition (which lies
at the basis of the positive laws of war) requires that international law and morality
penetrate into the heat of battle.
Admittedly, this is a most difficult task.
Many have said that it is inherently hopeless, that war and law are incompatible.
The first line of rebuttal is that rules of war
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have been observed and to some extent
continue to be observed. Still we must
admit that the rules which are observed
have increasingly tended to be limited to
non-decisive aspects of war and that the
principal means of modern war remain
virtually unrestrained by law. This unhappy
state of affairs is in great measure explained
by the technological and ideological characteristics of modern total war. But we cannot avoid the conclusion that it is also due
in part to the neglect of the laws of war by
internationalists since the end of the First
World War. 15 So it is that we are confronted with a situation where we must, to
all practical purposes, begin from the beginning if we are to build a realistic body
of principles and rules governing the utilization of force in the international community.
In confronting this enormous task we
face a number of perplexing problems,
even before we come to grips with the substantive military, technological, political
and moral problems that are the heart of
the matter. It seems to me that the first
and in a way, overriding, problem is that
of finding an academic, professional, or
intellectual "home" for studies of the regulation of international force. The laws of
war concern military matters and it is to the
credit of the United States armed forces
that they have made an outstanding record
in the development of international law.
The great tradition of Francis Lieber has
been carried on by the Army in its field
manuals and the tradition of international
law studies at the Naval War College in
Newport is justly celebrated. But the regu-

15 O'Brien, The Meaning of "Military Necessity"
y1 I.nternational Law, 1 WORLD POLITY 109, 110.
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lation of means of warfare ultimately involves policy decisions, based upon the
highest considerations of national interest
and, we trust, of morality. It is not within
the province of the military to speculate
about such matters and they do not.
The laws of war appear to be a field for
legal study, but here again we have problems. The modern lawyer is accustomed,
on the whole, to highly developed, advanced legal systems where the principal
problems have been resolved and the task
is one of applying well-established concepts
and rules to new circumstances. A typical
lawyer's reaction to a plea for a revival of
the laws of war is to recommend a thorough study of existing conventional law,
leading to a "restatement" or "codification" of the law. Alternately he may suggest that treaty proposals be drafted for
submission to the great powers. Students of
modern war try in vain to explain that there
is not much left to '.'restate" or "codify,"
that the old legal order governing international force collapsed when its material and
moral foundations and assumptions collapsed under the impact of total war. Finally, it is hard to get recognition of the
simple fact that we cannot draft proposals
until we know what we really want to propose and that most of the questions raised
by modern means of warfare are as far
from receiving coherent answers as they
were in 1918 or 1945.
What is needed today is not a team of
experts in legal research on loan from the
West Publishing Company to codify the
laws of war but rather imaginative legal
pioneers, possessed of a good working
knowledge of military science and international relations, who can chart some promising courses which nations with a con-
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science might follow in their international
and defense policies.
We turn next to moralists and to organizations such as the CAIP itself which are
vitally concerned with the problems of
limiting international force. Here the most
frequent response is the plea of lack of expertise in either the field of military science
or of law. Moreover, those who are dedicated to peace find it most difficult to turn
their thoughts to the -unpleasant possibilities suggested by the very idea of laws of
war.
And so it goes, with the result that
serious study of the laws of war has been
most unusual in our times. To the student
of the subject it seems that he always
speaks to the wrong audience. A military
audience is indulgent but limitation of violence is either a matter for "higher authority" or for private contemplation in the post
chapel on Sunday. The legal audience
wants to restrict the discussion to strictly
legal matters such as the effects of a state
of war on contracts with an enemy alien.
Quite frequently the audience of religious
organizations finds the whole subject unpleasant, beyond their knowledge, and
vaguely treasonable to their aspirations for
world peace and order.
The truth of the matter, of course, is
that all of these groups have their contribution to make. The military must tell us
what the strategic and technical considerations are; the lawyer must help us to
formulate our principles and rules and institutions; and, above all, the moralists and
the informed lay community must help us
to find the right practical answers from the
general precepts of our moral code. No one
group, nor any individual, can be expected
to have a complete grasp of all facets of

these complex problems. But we must all
do our best, cooperating as much as possible, to create a climate of opinion, both in
high places where policy is made and
throughout the informed public, which will
promise a more efficacious attempt to control international conflict.
There are other problems involved in the
study of legal limitation of force in international relations which may be appropriately raised here. The serious student of the
subject is constantly obliged to divert his
efforts from the grim problems of his field
to a kind of-never-ending apologetics concerning the very existence of the Law of
War. Some of the most recurring objections
are the following:
(1) Efforts designed to prevent war, to
"outlaw" force, are inherently opposed to
efforts to regulate war. Why "regulate"
criminal behavior? The Laws of War belong to the past, when all states had the unlimited sovereign right to go to war. Now
that that right no longer exists, there is no
need for codes of conduct in time of war.
Moreover, talk of the Law of War is subversive to the efforts to eliminate war.
In a somewhat more subjective form,
this viewpoint is represented by the reproach which a lady from the Red Cross
directed to a professor during a seminar on
International Law at Georgetown in 1946.
"If you men," she observed, "would only
stop talking about war so much perhaps we
would not have so many wars."
Unfortunately there does not seem to be
any conclusive evidence that "talking about
wars" has a controlling effect on their occurrence. The French talked about wars in
a most excited and vehement fashion from
1871 to 1914 and if one could say that the
result was World War I, it could as well be
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argued that the result was 43 years of
peace which is not such a bad record. On
the other hand, no peoples tried so hard to
avoid war or even to give serious thought
to preparations, for defense than the English and French between the two world
wars. Need we mention in addition to
Belgians, Dutch, Danes, Norwegians and
others?

for the occupant as well as for the occupied
peoples. All of these matters are long overdue for serious consideration. To say that
such consideration is in competition with
and contradictory to efforts to prevent the
outbreak of international violence is to
place an almost overwhelming pressure on
our infant institutions for the preservation
of peace.

In any event, under the United Nations
system there is still considerable room for
large-scale fighting in the world. Whether
we call it war, aggression, police actions or
whatever, all of the perennial problems of
what used to be called war arise-prisoners
of war, protection of the sick and wounded,
protection of peoples under military occupation, natural rights, as well as the ultimate problem of limiting the means of war
themselves. It will not do to say that the
war never should have occurred, or that it
isonly a police action against misguided
war criminals and aggressors. Human beings on both sides of the conflict will be
suffering and any mitigation of that suffering is urgently wanted, no matter how
modest (and, it might be added, no matter
what the motivation behind these mitigations).

Underlying this whole misconception is
a deeper error, the idea that international
politics, so-called power politics, are irrevocably prejudicial to international law
and order.

It is gratifying that the vast majority
of international law authorities have recognized that the question of the legality or
illegality of recourse to force does not and
ought not affect the operation of the laws
of war once combat is joined. Prisoners
have a right to protection whether they are
ordinary belligerents, policemen, aggressors, or partisans. Nuclear weapons have
exactly the same characteristics whether
they are used by saints or sinners. There
are enormous problems involved in the
government of occupied areas, problems

Encouraged by super-realists on the one
hand and over-zealous internationalists on
the other, students of international relations
and the general public are led to believe
that power politics and world law and order
are mutually exclusive concepts. Common
sense alone refutes this all-too-prevalent
attitude. Law and order, in any community,
operate on political and other realities. If
law and organizations are out of touch with
these realities their effect will be small.
Moreover, power politics is not wrong in
itself. All societies operate as arenas of
power politics. Power politics become bad
(or as we say, "Machiavellian") in their
employment for evil purposes. It is precisely the function of international law and
order to aid in diverting international politics and power from evil or unworthy objects and to channel these forces insofar as
possible towards the international common
good.
In order to carry out this mission, international law and order requires power political weapons. This should not be surprising. The same thing is true in domestic society. In a mature, successful state such as
the United States, politics and "politicking"
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go on incessantly. Moreover, "power" and
"force" of all kinds are applied to the operation of government, as Federalist No. 10
predicted. Finally, even in so advanced a
juridical order as the United States it is
sometimes necessary to resort to brute
force in order to uphold law and order.
International law and order have to be
enforced and enforcement means force.
Just as in the domestic order it takes
"power politics" ("politicking," lobbying,
threatening, compromising, and sometimes
downright conflict) to make law and order
prevail, so must power politics be mastered
and harnessed on behalf of the international
juridical order.
(2) It is interesting to take note of another objection which has been raised
against the thinking of Father Murray, Kissinger, and others with respect to limited
nuclear war and the whole idea of controlled international violence. It is said that
talk about limitation and regulation of
modern nuclear war or, indeed, of any war,
is too rational, too removed from reality.
How can we discuss such a chaotic and
horrible subject as though it were a chess
problem or an exercise in pure logic? The
world is not rational, war is not rational,
the terrible forces which may be unleashed
are irrational and beyond control. It is
foolish to try to solve these problems by intricate reasoning. Besides, how can you be
so dispassionate in the face of such human
suffering?
Such attitudes are understandable. We
revolt from the very discussion of modern
total war. Yet there are those who cannot
afford the luxury of revolting and throwing
up their hands. The members of the National Security Council, who have a much
more detailed knowledge of the facts - or

ought to, must make decisions based on
those facts. Our military leaders must live
with the facts of total war every minute of
the day. Every responsible statesman and
decision-maker is in fact daily engaging in
a kind of grim "brinkmanship" (an activity publicized but hardly invented by the
late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles).
Are our moral and intellectual leaders permitted to find such problems too revolting
to discuss realistically? And if there is discussion is it seriously contended that it
should not be carried on with all the accuracy and clarity which language and logic
can supply, or that it should not be as free
of subjective, emotional considerations as
possible?
General U. S. Grant hated war. He particularly hated to see men killed and
wounded. He had no stomach for it. Yet he
had a job to do and he believed that the job
could best be done by the simple strategy of
attrition, so he closed his eyes to the casualty lists and kept hammering away until
Lee collapsed. Would the Army of the Potomac, would the Union, have been better
served if Grant had succumbed to his
human feelings of compassion and disgust
in the sight of the carnage that he himself
was ordering?
What then can Catholic thought contribute to the problem of force in the international juridical order? In general we may
answer by saying that Catholic thought must
develop a coherent Theory of Force. Those
of us who have attempted to apply the concepts of the Doctrine of the Just War and
the statements of Pope Pius XII to the practical problems of limitation of modern
international conflict have found that there
is an enormous gap between our existing
theory and the realities that confront the
statesman and the soldier. We must pro-
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gress beyond such general concepts as
proportionality and right intention and discuss the proportionality of specific means
of warfare in an historic or hypothetical
context sufficiently concrete to permit us to
say: "This is the kind of thing which is
not proportionate, but that means in that
context would be proportionate. This belligerent did not have right intention in the
end but he would have been in consonance
with right intention if he had stopped here."
This means that we have to rise above
our penchant for turning up our noses at
the thought of force and power politics.
Both are everyday necessities in the best of
organized communities. We must learn
more about these "realities" of international relations and when we have mastered
them we must enrich our sound basic principles with the practical knowledge that we
have gained about the world in which those
principles must be applied.
It is along these lines that the Institute
of World Polity at Georgetown and cooperating scholars are working. We are studying the practical problems of prisoners of
war, guerrilla warfare, submarine warfare,
nuclear warfare in its many possible forms,
and belligerent occupation with a view to
assessing the possibilities for bringing international ethics and international law
back into the void of modern total war.
We are well aware of the heavy odds against
us, but we do not feel that they are necessarily greater than those confronting other
internationalists who take on the great
problems of international economic, social,
health, moral and intellectual reform. And
we feel that, whatever our doubts as to
our competence in such complex and
critical matters, we are laboring in an
honorable tradition that includes some of
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the finest products of Scholasticism, and
in more recent years, a succession of
Georgetown professors of International Law
which includes Professors James Brown
Scott and Ernst Feilchenfeld.
Yes, we must work for the improvement
of the young juridical institutions of our
international order, not only within the UN
system but also in the several regional systems, the Organization of American States
and NATO in particular. We must bend
every effort to narrow the area wherein
unfettered international conflict reigns by
expanding the scope and increasing the efficacity of the institutions of international
law and international organization. But
we must realize that working for the international juridical order does not stop with
mere enthusiasm and support for international institutions. It entails the iealization that there is a duty to join, if necessary, in coercive measures on behalf of the
juridically organized community. The international juridical order is not advanced
by acquiescence in brutal injustices, as
Pius XII saw so clearly. And once the possibility of recourse to force is raised we are
obliged to give much more attention to the
policies and principles which ought to govern the use of coercive measures on behalf
of the international juridical community.
This in turn requires strenuous efforts to
bring the generalities of our doctrine much
closer to the realities of modern international conflict.
Not long ago I attended a Confirmation
ceremony for adult converts at St. Matthew's Cathedral. Appropriately, Bishop
Hannan, formerly of the Airborne Infantry,
presided. Against the background of continued headlines announcing Communist
(Continued on page 47)

